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Abstract 
 
 
/ŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ďǇ ůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ conjecture that the necessity of trading through money in monetised 
economies might hinder convergence to competitive equilibrium, and hence, for example, cause 
unemployment, we experimentally investigate behaviour in markets where trading has to be done 
through money. In order to evaluate the properties of these markets, we compare their behaviour to 
behaviour in markets without money, where money cannot intervene. As the trading mechanism 
might be a compounding factor, we investigate two kinds of market mechanism: the double auction, 
where bids, asks and trades take place in continuous time throughout a trading period; and the 
clearing house, where bids and asks are placed once in a trading period, and which are then cleared 
by an aggregating device. We thus have four treatments, the pairwise combinations of non-
monetised/monetised trading with double auction/clearing house. We find that: convergence is 
faster under non-monetised trading, implying that the necessity of using money to facilitate trade 
hinders convergence; that monetised trading is noisier than non-monetised trading; and that the 
volume of trade and realised surpluses are higher with the double auction than the clearing house. 
As far as efficiency is concerned, monetised trading lowers both informational and allocational 
efficiency, and while the double auction outperforms the clearing house in terms of allocational 
efficiency, the clearing house is marginally better than the double auction in terms of informational 
efficiency when trade is through money. Crucially we confirm the conjecture that inspired these 
experiments: that the necessity to use money in trading hinders convergence to competitive 
equilibrium, lowers realised trades and surpluses, and hence may cause unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
As Clower famously said in 1967, as part of the then on-ŐŽŝŶŐ ‘<ĞǇŶĞƐŝĂŶZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? (partly initiated 
by Leijonhufvud, 1968):  ?DŽŶĞǇďƵǇƐŐŽŽĚƐĂŶĚŐŽŽĚƐďƵǇŵŽŶĞǇ ?ďƵƚŐŽŽĚƐĚŽŶŽƚďƵǇŐŽŽĚƐ ?. 
This aphorism seemed to have been forgotten as part of the demise of Keynes ? ideas, but is now 
coming back into econoŵŝƐƚƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?The key idea is that, in 
money-based economies, goods cannot be bartered directly for each other; instead money has to be 
used as a go-between. This may interfere with convergence to equilibrium, particularly, as Clower 
thought, in the labour market: firms do not employ workers as they cannot see the extra sales 
generated by them doing so. Involuntary unemployment may result. 
/Ŷ ,ĞǇ ĂŶĚ ŝ ĂŐŶŽ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ǁĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ŽŶ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƚŽ ƚĞƐƚ ůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ƵƐŝŶŐ Ă
monetised trading market with the double auction trading mechanism. We did indeed see a 
departure from convergence to the competitive equilibrium, but that experiment was partial in that 
it did not compare the monetised trading outcome with the non-monetised trading outcome. Other 
factors may have been influencing our results. 
One possibility is that the results may have been the consequence of the objective function imposed 
on our subjects (that of a utility function rather than through the use of reservation prices). Indeed 
our objective function (maximising a function of two variables, rather than simply maximising 
surplus as is usually the case) may be perceived as being more complicated for subjects to 
understand, and it may have been that, rather than having to trade through money, that caused the 
lack of convergence. 
Moreover we felt that the lack of convergence might have resulted from the trading mechanism that 
we used, rather than from the trading through money. While, as we note later, there is a general 
acceptance that the double auction mechanism is robustly efficient, there are studies that show 
greater efficiency with other mechanisms. For example, Goeree and Lindsay (2012b) show that with 
ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂůů Ă  ‘ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?  W in which subjects enter effectively a demand schedule  W 
efficiency reaches 95% while with a parallel double auction market it reaches only 77%. So we 
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implemented additional treatments with a second mechanism  W that of the clearing house3  W in 
which subjects enter effectively a (price,quantity) pair which are then aggregated to clear the market 
by the experimenter. Hence the present experiment, in which we have four treatments, with each of 
non-monetised trading and monetised trading paired with each of two trading mechanisms  W double 
auction and clearing house. By  ‘monetised trading ? we mean trading where one good is singled out 
as the medium of exchange, and also where this good does not enter into the subjects ? payoff 
functions. We shall see that our conjecture about the two market mechanisms is not confirmed by 
ƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛconjecture is  W for both mechanisms. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, ǁĞŽƵƚůŝŶĞůŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
literature that explored his conjecture; in section 3, we discuss the issues of efficiency in markets; in 
section 4, we describe our experimental design; in section 5, we describe our results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. ůŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ 
ůŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞǁĂƐƐŝŵƉůĞĂŶĚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶŐ Wthe necessity of monetised trading might 
cause a lack of convergence to the competitive equilibrium. The publication of his paper sparked off 
a flurry of theoretical work aimed at investigating his conjecture. There is one clear and repeated 
conclusion from this literature: that convergence to the competitive equilibrium might not be 
attained. Moreover, there might be several possible equilibria, and expectations might be important. 
The various theoretical contributions differ in their assumptions about the market and about 
trading. We cannot cover all the contributions, and so concentrate on those that are relevant for our 
experimental design. This was as follows (we give more detail later): we had two goods in our 
experiment and two kinds of agents, both of which started trading with stocks of just one of the two 
goods. They are motivated to trade through a payoff function, which is a Cobb-Douglas function 
defined over the amounts of the two goods that they hold at the end of trading. In the monetised 
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 tĞŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐŶŽƚ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐ 'ŽĞƌĞĞĂŶĚ>ŝŶĚƐĂǇ ?Ɛ(2012b) schedule market, though it does have 
some features in common. 
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treatments they had to trade through money  W which is worthless at the end of the experiment. 
Because of this feature, and to facilitate trade, we implemented a random stopping mechanism, for 
otherwise subjects might backwardly induct with, as a consequence, no trade resulting.  
One of the earlier papers ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ƵƉ ůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞwas that of Barro and Grossman 
(1971) which adopted a framework similar to ours, ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽŐŽŽĚƐ ? ‘ůĂďŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? and 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĂďůĞĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ money. However for most of the analysis prices are fixed and the 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ? dŚĞǇ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  ‘ĚŝƐĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐ
should be considered as equilibrium with fixed prices. Similarly Benassy (1975) talks about Neo-
Keynesian Equilibrium (or K-equilibrium)  W though once again prices are fixed  W finding the existence 
of some equilibria where the level of trade and economic activity are depressed because of the 
wrong exchange rate. Both these papers have centralised trading. In contrast, Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989) talk about equilibria with random matching and conclude that the  “equilibria are not 
generally Pareto optimal and that when multiple equilibria coexist they are not generally Pareto 
comparable. ? Lucas (1980), like Barro and Grossman (1971), models an economy with two goods 
and money, but with uncertainty (here about preferences). He ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ
equilibrium  ?ǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ? Ostroy and Starr (1974) start with a barter economy and then 
introduce money. They conclude that  “in the absence of double coincidence such a trading rule [one 
essentially satisfying double coincidence of wants] will achieve an inefficient allocation far from 
competitive equilibrium ?. Moreover, ƚŚĞǇ ĂƐƐĞƌƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ďĂƌƚĞƌ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĞǆŝƐƚ ŶŽ  “ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ?
trading rules (that is, rules which place limits on the ingenuity or computational capacity of traders). 
Shapley and Shubik (1977) adopt a game-theoretic analysis and consider the various possible non-
cooperative equilibria. They conclude ƚŚĂƚ  “a striking feature of this kind of equilibrium is its non-
ŽƉƚŝŵĂůŝƚǇ ?.  This result is echoed throughout this literature. 
Some recent papers consider the adjustment process of prices in this kind of framework; so their 
analyses are dynamic. Of particular relevance are the papers by Crockett et al (2011), Gjerstad 
(2013) and Goeree and Lindsay (2012a and 2012b). We are primarily interested in the differences 
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between the four treatments, but dynamics obviously play a role since trading is repeated over a 
random number of trading days. If the price adjustment process is unstable, then we have to be 
careful about interpreting our results. We will have more to say about this later. 
 
3. Efficiency and market mechanisms 
We implement two different market mechanisms: the double auction and the clearing house. We 
wanted to see if the deterioration moving from non-monetised trading to monetised trading was a 
ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŽƵďůĞ ĂƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? Ƶƚ ĨŝƌƐƚ ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ŵĞĂŶ ďǇ  ‘ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?.
Here we are referring to efficiency. There are several definitions of market efficiency, but we 
concentrate on two: informational efficiency and allocational efficiency. The former concerns 
convergence to the competitive price, and the latter refers to the realised gains from trade. 
Friedman (1993) provides an early experimental study comparing the double auction and the 
clearing house, though in the context of non-monetised trading4 ?,ĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐŚŽƵƐĞ
markets are as informationally efficient as double auction markets and almost as allocationally 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ? ǁŚŝůĞ ĂƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ &ƌŝĞĚŵĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞ Ăǁ alth of experimental evidence by       
ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƉƌŝĐĞ ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŵĂůůĞƐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ^D
[clearing house], while ǀŽůƵŵĞŝƐŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŝŶ ?ĚŽƵďůĞĂƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? As we have already noted these 
results pertain to non-monetised trading. We are interested in seeing whether they carry over to 
monetised trading. 
Our focus on different market mechanisms and trading rules is also relevant for policy concerns 
since actual financial markets are organised in such a way as implying that both trading through 
money and trading directly (without money) can occur. Moreover, there are institutions which use a 
clearing house mechanism (such as the MTS Electronic Government Bond market), whereas Stock 
Exchanges generally implement a double auction mechanism. 
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4. The Experiment 
We now give more detail on the experimental design. The environment is as simple as possible, yet 
staying ĨĂŝƚŚĨƵů ƚŽůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ƚǁŽŐŽŽĚƐ ? X and Y. There are two types of traders: 
Type X and Type Y and there are n of each type5. Trading is divided up into trading days. In each day, 
Type X traders are endowed with a quantity x of Good X, but none of Good Y; mutatis mutandis Type 
Y traders are endowed with none of Good X but a quantity y of Good Y. Trade takes place through 
the day and the payment to each subject depends upon the amounts of the two goods they end up 
with at the end of the day. To be specific if a trader of either type ends the day with x of Good X and 
y of Good Y their payment for that day will be  ? ?я ?ǆǇ ? in euro cents6. Clearly if either type of agent 
does not trade in any day, they end up with zero payment for that day. Goods cannot be carried over 
from day to day. 
We had four treatments, namely each of non-monetised (N) trading and monetised (M) trading 
paired with each of double auction (D) and clearing house (C). We had three different parameter 
sets within each treatment, and each of these was duplicated, giving a grand total of 24 groups of 
experimental subjects. We use the following notation7 for the parameter sets: 
 double auction trading (D) clearing house trading (C) 
non-monetised trading (N) ND40,40, ND60,30, ND30,60 NC40,40, NC60,30, NC30,60 
monetised trading (M) MD40,40, MD60,30, MD30,60 MC40,40, MC60,30, MC30,60 
 
In the non-monetised (N) treatments, each trading day is independent of all the others and there is 
no money. In the monetised (M) treatments, however, there is (experimental) money and trade 
must be carried out using this (experimental) money. Accordingly, in the monetised treatments, we 
divided up each trading day into a morning, an afternoon and an evening: in the morning the market 
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 In the experiment we put n equal to 5. We deliberately made the numbers of each type the same, and made 
the total number of subjects in each session sufficiently high to avoid any monopolistic possibilities. 
6
 The experiment was conducted in Italy and subjects were paid in euros. There are 100 centesimi in a euro. A 
euro is currently worth about £0.74 or $1.13. 
7
 The notation  ‘ABa,b ? indicates an experimental session using the AB trading mechanism with parameters x=a 
and y=b. 
7 
 
for Good X was open and agents could buy and sell Good X using (experimental) money; in the 
afternoon the market for Good Y was open and agents could buy and sell Good Y using 
(experimental) money; in the evening accounting was done and the agents informed as to how much 
real money they had earned for that day. The experimental money used in the trading process had 
no value, however; all agents were endowed with a stock of experimental money at the beginning of 
the experimental session but it was worthless at the end. 
There is a potential problem here however: if the subjects knew the number of trading days that the 
experiment would last, and if they could perform backward induction, no trade would ever take 
place. Since experimental money is worthless at the end of the experiment, no Type Y would want to 
accept any experimental money on the afternoon of the final day; as a consequence no Type X 
would accept any money in the morning of the final day, and so on backwards. To solve this 
problem, we made the number of days that the experiment lasted random. Ideally we would have 
preferred to have had a stationary mechanism so that the probability of any day being the final day, 
given that the experiment had lasted to that day, would be a fixed number, but there are two 
problems with this: first, subjects seem to have difficulty in understanding the mechanism (if we say 
the probability of the experimental session finishing at the end of any day is 0.1, they get 
increasingly nervous at and after day 10, even though there is no need to be); second if we 
implement it honestly, we could end up with a an experimental session having very few days, thus 
giving us very few observations. We adopted a compromise: we said that the experiment would last 
at least 18 days, and that then and thereafter the probability would be one-half that the experiment 
would finish at the end of any day. In practice, 13 of the 24 experimental sessions lasted 18 periods, 
9 lasted 19 periods and 2 lasted 20 periods.  
As we have already noted, we had three different parameter sets within each treatment, and each 
of these were duplicated. These sets differed in terms of the parameters x and y. To be specific: 8 of 
the experimental sessions had parameters x = y = 40; 8 had parameters x = 60 and y = 30; and 8 had 
8 
 
parameters x = 30 and y = 60. In some of the data analysis that follows we aggregate the data for the 
duplicated three experimental sessions of each treatment. 
Now let us investigate the stationary equilibrium implied by this setup. We consider each day as a 
whole. Let us denote by p and q the (absolute) prices of Good X and Good Y. Type X subjects want to 
maximise  ? ?я ?ǆǇ ?subject to px = px + qy; the solution to this is x* = x/2 and y* = (px)/(2q).  Type Y 
subjects want to maximise  ? ?я ?ǆǇ ?subject to qy = px + qy; the solution to this is x* = (qy)/(2p) and y* 
= y/2. Given that there are equal numbers of each type, equilibrium implies that, (px)/(2q) = y/2, and 
x/2 = (qy)/(2p), and hence that the relative price of Good Y in the stationary equilibrium, q/p, is 
equal to x/y. Thus the good relatively lower in supply is relatively higher priced. With our three 
parameter sets, this stationary equilibrium relative price of Good Y is 1 with parameter set 1, 2 with 
parameter set 2, and 0.5 with parameter set 3. Our experiment is partly to see if actual relative 
prices converge to these. We note that in this static competitive equilibrium, the payment to any 
subject on any given day is given by  ?я ?x y).  
One might also be interested in a dynamic equilibrium, if the experiment is considered as dynamic8. 
Clearly, in such an equilibrium, both types of agent have to end each day with the same amount of 
money as they started (for otherwise one Type would be increasing their stock at the expense of the 
other). Now consider a subject of Type X, starting each day with an amount x of Good X (the same 
analysis, mutatis mutandis, applies to the Type Y). Let us denote by Vt(x) the total expected earnings 
for such a subject over the lifetime of the experiment as viewed from period t.  Then we have that 
Vt(x) = max{ ? ?я ?ǆǇ ?н ? ?-p)Vt+1(x) + p0} subject to px = px + qy (since when the experiment finishes no 
further earnings are possible). It follows that if Vt(x) = V(x) for all t, then V(x) = max{ ? ?я ?ǆǇ ? ?Ɖ}  
subject to px = px + qy, and hence we get the same objective function as in the one-shot problem  W 
and the solution is identical. The random stopping mechanism makes no difference to this 
equilibrium, though there may well be others. 
                                                          
8
 In a sense it is a repeated, rather than a dynamic, problem, except for the existence of  W ultimately worthless 
 W experimental money. 
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We now give some practical detail. The experiment was carried out in the purpose-built CESARE9 
laboratory at LUISS in Rome. It was run using software written in Visual Studio by Andrea Lombardo. 
Subjects were recruited from a register using ORSEE (Greiner 2004).  Instructions were in Italian; an 
English translation can be found in the Appendix (not to be published) and online where there is 
further detail. The software included a calculator which enables subjects to see the real money 
earnings for any end-of-day holdings of the two goods. There were a total of 24 sessions, 6 of each 
treatment, with 10 subjects in each experimental session. In any one treatment, all parameters were 
fixed. No communication was allowed between the subjects. After subjects arrived they were given 
written instructions and any questions were answered. Subjects were aware only of their 
endowments of the two goods and not the endowments of the other subjects in the experimental 
session. The experiment then started and continued until the computer randomly determined when 
it was over. Subjects were paid in cash and, after signing a receipt, were free to go. No subject 
participated in more than one session. SƵďũĞĐƚƐ ĞĂƌŶĞĚ ŽŶ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ?. Different treatments 
lasted different amounts of time, with the monetised treatments taking longer.    
A brief comment should be made about the calculation of the clearing price in the non-monetised 
clearing house treatment, as it differs from the usual case where trading is with money. In the usual 
context all buyers state a (price, quantity) pair; sellers likewise. These are aggregated into step 
functions in (price, quantity) space and a market-clearing price found where the step functions 
intersect. However, in our setup, where we have two goods, the mechanism is somewhat different: 
ďƵǇĞƌƐƐƚĂƚĞĂ ?ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨy ?ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨz ?ƉĂŝƌĂŶĚƐĞůůĞƌƐ ?ĚŽůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ ?dŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝƐĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ ?/Ĩ
ĂďƵǇĞƌ ?ƐƉĂŝƌis (x,y) this means that he/she is willing to exchange up to x units of X in exchange for 
at least y units of Y. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, for the sellers.  How do we find the 
equilibrium relative price? We cannot use step functions as neither good is money and we want to 
find an equilibrium relative price of Y (or of X  W which is the inverse). For example if 2 units of X are 
exchanged for 3 units of Y, then the relative price of Y is 2/3 or the relative price of X is 3/2. How do 
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we find this? There are two ways  W which give the same answer. The first is to draw a graph with the 
quantity of X along the horizontal axis and the relative price of X on the vertical axis. In this space the 
supply curve is the usual kind of step function, but the demand function is different: between the 
horizontal steps the demand curve takes the form of a rectangular hyperbola. The same is true, 
mutatis mutandis, if one does the analysis with the quantity of Y on the horizontal axis and the 
relative price of Y on the vertical axis. With either analysis one finds the relative price of X (or of Y  W 
its inverse) and the quantities of the two goods exchanged in equilibrium. Of course, we did not 
explain, or need to explain, this to the subjects, though we did show them a graph of the implied 
demand and supply functions.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Prices and Volumes 
The key results concerning the pattern of prices during the periods of the experiment can be found 
in Figure 1. We should note that for each treatment and each parameter set, there are two lines, 
corresponding to the duplicated experimental sessions. Overall means and standard deviations can 
be found in Table 1. If we start with the conventional treatment  W the non-monetised double 
auction, ND  W we see from the top left hand graph that the relative price of Good Y converges rapidly 
to the theoretical predictions (1 for ND40,40, 2 for ND60,30 and 0.5 for ND30,60). The first of these is 
particularly rapid, but this may be because of some kind of focal point effect (equality of prices). This 
may also account for the initial stages of ND60,30 and ND30,60  W starting off around 1 before almost 
converging to their theoretical values; ND30,60 is slightly high at the end. The non-monetised clearing 
house, NC, in the top-right, is almost as good, though here one of the NC60,30 sessions is slightly 
above and one slightly below its theoretical value, while one of the NC30,60 is also above its 
theoretical value.  
When we get on to the monetised sessions things change. The bottom-lower graph in Figure 1 
shows that prices are erratic, particularly for MD40,40. The mean price in MD40,40 is in between the 
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mean price in MD60,30 and MD30,60, as it should be, but the mean prices in MD60,30 and MD30,60 are 
somewhat away from their theoretical values, and the variances are high  W indicating that the 
trading through money is hindering convergence to equilibrium. Interestingly the monetised   
clearing house (in the bottom-right) is somewhat less erratic and the average price in MC40,40 is close 
to its theoretical value, while in MC60,30 the relative price of Good Y is below what it should be and in 
MC30,60 it is slightly above.  
We suspect that the sharp upturn in the relative price of Good Y in the monetised  double auction 
may have been a consequence of subjects getting apprehensive about the end of the experiment, 
and, in particular, with Type Y subjects getting increasingly reluctant to sell (in exchange for probably 
worthless experimental money). 
One feature that we would expect from prices being away from equilibrium is that trading volumes 
are different from those that we would expect. Figure 2 shows total trading volumes, expressed as a 
percentage of the volume in the static competitive equilibrium. Means and standard deviations are, 
once again, shown in Table 1. We should note that there is no reason why this measure might not be 
above 100% - ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ƚŽŽŵƵĐŚ ?ƚƌĂĚĞ ?  
Looking at Figure 2, we see that in the non-monetised double auction treatment, volumes are 
generally close to 100%. The same is true for the non-monetised  clearing house, though it takes 
somewhat longer to get close to 100%. Things change dramatically, though, with the monetised 
treatments, where trading volumes are well below 100%, both for the double auction and the 
clearing house, though the latter is more erratic.  
 
5.2 Dynamics 
In order to shed some light on the dynamics of the price adjustment process, we present in Figure 3, 
scatters of the change in the relative price of Good Y (pt-pt-1) against the departure in the previous 
period of the relative price from the equilibrium relative price (p*-pt-1) over all 6 experimental 
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sessions of each treatment. We have 102 observations for each treatment. The fitted relationships 
are as follows: 
non-monetised double auction:           (pt-pt-1) = -0.0014 + .3334(p*-pt-1)    R=.461 
monetised double auction:                   (pt-pt-1) = 0.1231 + .6616(p*-pt-1)    R=.578 
non-monetised clearing house:            (pt-pt-1) = 0.0000 +  .1452(p*-pt-1)    R=.295 
monetised clearing house:                   (pt-pt-1) = -0.297 + .3461(p*-pt-1)    R=.3461 
 
All these indicate stability in the adjustment process for all treatments. 
 
5.3 Payments 
Average payments to subjects per period are shown in Figure 4. Summaries are also presented in 
Table 2. In both the Figure and the Table, we present actual payments as a percentage of the 
ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝĐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ PƚŚĞƐĞůĂƚƚĞƌĂƌĞ ? ? ? ? ?with parameter set 1 (40,40), 
ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?10 with parameter sets 2 (60,30) and parameter set 3 (30,60). It follows from the definition 
of these variables that the maximum the average can be in all cases is 100.  
In Figure 4 it is clear that in the non-monetised double auction sessions payments to subjects are 
around what they should be in the static competitive equilibrium. In the non-monetised  clearing 
house sessions payments in general were a lot lower than in the non-monetised double auction, 
though they were approaching the latter at the end. The same is true in the monetised treatments, 
where payments on average to the subjects in the clearing house treatment were lower than in the 
double auction. We note that payments were also slightly more erratic in the monetised double 
auction as compared with the non-monetised double auction. Going from non-monetised trading to 
monetised trading with the double auction sees a decrease in average payments to subjects, while 
there was only a small decrease in the average payments to subjects with the clearing house. 
However this analysis ignores a trend effect: with the non-monetised clearing house the trend is 
upwards throughout the periods of trading, almost reaching 100 by the end, while the monetised   
clearing house starts higher but ends up below 100 at the end.  
 
                                                          
10
 It should be noted that we chose the various endowments to make these as nearly equal across parameter 
sets to make it fair to the subjects. 
13 
 
5.4 Efficiency 
Finally we present some results on efficiency in the four treatments. As we remarked in section 3, 
we use two measures  W informational efficiency and allocational efficiency. Table 3 shows the 
results: 3.1 presents the results on all the data  W over the first 1811 periods of all six sessions (where 
we have 108 observations in each treatment); 3.2 and 3.3 disaggregate the results into the first half 
and the second half of each data set (108 observations in each treatment). If we concentrate on all 
the data12  W 3.1  W we see that monetised trading lowers the informational and allocational efficiency 
for both market mechanisms, with the difference being particularly significant for allocational 
efficiency for the double auction. Interestingly the clearing house is marginally but not significantly 
more informationally efficient than the double auction in the monetised treatment. The breakdown 
of the data into the two halves  W Tables 3.2 and 3.3  W shows that informational efficiency increases 
for both trading types as time passes, as one would hope, but allocational efficiency falls for the 
double auction. 
 
6. Conclusions 
One clear message emerges from these experiments: money hinders convergence to equilibrium. As 
a consequence, realised trading volumes in the monetised treatments are lower than they would be 
in the static competitive equilibrium, and, of necessity, realised payments/surpluses are lower. 
Moreover, switching to a clearing house mechanism does not remove the inefficiencies resulting 
from monetised trading. However, we should note that the reduction in payments in the clearing 
house is much smaller than the reduction for the double auction, but mainly because the clearing 
house starts from a lower base.  Indeed, we see markedly lower payments in the clearing house 
treatment than in the double auction treatment  W a result different from that reported by Friedman 
(1993). It is not clear what caused these differences, thouŐŚŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ&ƌŝĞĚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
                                                          
11
 Different sessions had different lengths and the shortest length was 18. 
12
 The p-values report the significance levels of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, between the figures in the 
adjacent rows or columns. 
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experiments, trading was always between a good (with a stated value) and cash; in contrast we have 
trading between two goods (either directly or indirectly) the value of which depended upon the 
combinations of the two goods. Moreover in FrŝĞĚŵĂŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƵƐĞĚ trading for cash, 
the price of the trade was always explicit, while in ours the price was implicit in terms of the ratio of 
the quantities. 
One difficulty facing the subjects in the monetised treatments, and one which is highlighted in the 
theoretical literature to which we have referred in section 2, is the question of expectations, crucially 
about the value of money. It has a zero value at the (random) end of the experiment, but while the 
experiment is continuing, it has a value in that it facilitates the implementation of future trades. All 
bidding and asking in the monetised treatments had to be done in money terms, and the whole issue 
of absolute prices for the two goods is crucial. So far, we have avoided any discussion of absolute 
prices  W framing all our analyses in terms of relative prices of the two goods  W but clearly this is a 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƚŚĞperceived end of the experiment draws 
nearer both sides of the market would get increasingly nervous about holding money. However, the 
effect of this is not clear, though it may be the case that buyers would be increasingly happy to pay 
more, and the sellers would be increasingly happy to ask more. Indeed we notice an increase in the 
absolute prices of the two goods as periods pass. But the key issue is on expectations  W and these 
may be driven by the past behaviour of absolute prices. Thus the results that we have found may 
just be consequeŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚfuture prices. But this in turn 
is linked to the uncertainty about future trades  W ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ůŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ
conjecture. 
The bottom line of our experiment is the finding that trading volumes, and payments, in the 
monetised treatments are lower than in the non-monetised treatments, and hence lower than they 
could/should be in the competitive equilibrium. This finding ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐůŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞ PƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
necessity of monetised trading may cause lack of trade, and hence, in particular, create involuntary 
unemployment. Money does indeed impede convergence.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics on prices and volumes (actual and theoretic) 
Treatment Parameter 
set 
Endowment 
of good X of 
each of the 
5 Type X 
subjects 
Endowment 
of good Y of 
each of the 
5 Type Y 
subjects 
Theoretical 
relative  
price of 
Good Y 
Actual 
average 
relative 
price of 
Good Y 
s.d of 
relative 
price of 
Good Y  
Actual 
average 
trading 
volume  
s.d. of 
trading 
volume 
ND 1 40 40 1 0.93 0.06 102.84 11.15 
2 60 30 2 1.83 0.31 102.64 11.79 
3 30 60 0.50 0.67 0.11 99.61 10.76 
NC 1 40 40 1 1.07 0.12 95.04 19.57 
2 60 30 2 1.67 0.39 87.42 17.38 
3 30 60 0.50 0.66 0.1 79.44 18.51 
MD 1 40 40 1 1.33 0.41 65.25 21.25 
2 60 30 2 1.95 0.83 76.04 17.82 
3 30 60 0.50 0.85 0.3 63.6 19.36 
MC 1 40 40 1 1.14 0.35 63 16.7 
2 60 30 2 1.68 0.78 56.95 14.76 
3 30 60 0.50 0.58 0.4 50.38 14.07 
 
Key: i is the parameter set number 
 double auction (D) clearing house (C) 
non-monetised trading (N) NDi NCi 
monetised trading (M) MDi MCi 
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Table 2: Means and standard deviations of average payments to subjects expressed as a percentage 
of the payments in the static equilibrium 
 
 
 
Key: i is the parameter set number 
 double auction (D) clearing house (C) 
non-monetised trading (N) NDi NCi 
monetised trading (M) MDi MCi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Treatment Type Parameter set 1 (40,40) Parameter set  2 (60,30 Parameter set  3 (30,60) 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
ND X 97.03 7.19 95.46 9.32 80.38 12.55 
Y 90.13 7.55 89.58 10.97 107.64 8.82 
Both 93.58 4.73 92.52 3.62 94.01 4.22 
NC X 78.82 19.38 68.62 18.81 71.56 18.37 
Y 75 22.16 75.94 17.14 68.35 17.83 
Both 76.91 13.38 72.28 14.79 69.95 15.5 
MD X 79.35 13 87.41 18.4 69.07 17.72 
Y 93.98 12.1 82.14 15.88 96.51 16.38 
Both 86.67 9.36 84.77 7.22 82.79 7.54 
MC X 76.52 21.16 69.04 22.61 63.94 22.57 
Y 65.52 22.57 78.28 19.04 75.62 20.23 
Both 71.02 8.85 73.66 10.36 69.78 11.14 
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Table 3:  Efficiency measures and tests 
 
3.1 All Data (108 observations per cell) 
1: Informational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised  0.168 29.011% 0.231 
p-value 0.0333%  0.812% 
monetised  0.432 53.661% 0.424 
2: Allocational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised  6.696 0.000% 27.186 
p-value 0.006%  8.152% 
monetised  15.009 0.000% 28.601 
Two Blocks (54 observations per cell) 
3.2 Block 1 (first 9 observations of each experimental session  W 54 observations)  
1: Informational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised  0.2502 33.641% 0.288 
p-value 0.431%  38.105% 
monetised 0.501 38.689% 0.481 
 
2: Allocational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised  8.143 5.268% 34.545 
p-value 0.000%  52.209% 
monetised 13.939 0.000% 32.924 
3.3 Block 2 (second 9 observations of each experimental session  W 54 observations) 
1: Informational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised 0.087 0.169% 0.174 
p-value 0.118%  2.671% 
monetised 0.362 83.547 0.375 
2: Allocational efficiency (the lower the measure the more efficient) 
 double auction p-value clearing house 
non-monetised 5.362 0.000% 19.460 
p-value 0.000%  44.652% 
monetised 16.145 0.185% 23.991 
The p-values are the result of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for significance. 
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Figure 1: The Relative Prices of Good Y in the 12 parameter sets. (Key: ABi is relative price for treatment AB parameter set i) 
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Figure 2: Total trading Volumes (as a percentage of those in the static equilibrium) for the 12parameter sets (Key: ABi is total trading volume in treatment 
AB parameter set i) 
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Figure 3: scatters of change in relative price against departure from equilibrium (51 observations in each treatment)  
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Figure 4: Total Payments (as a percentage of those in the static equilibrium) for the 12 parameter sets (Key: ABi is total trading volume in treatment AB 
parameter set i) 
 
  
  
  
  
Appendix: not to be published: Instructions for the non-monetised trading double auction 
CESARE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Centro di Economia Sperimentale a Roma Est 
 
 
 
 Welcome to this experiment on the economics of market decision making.  The Italian Ministry of 
Education, MIUR, has provided the funds for the experiment.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid 
to you in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you can trade two goods  W Good X and 
Good Y  W in a sequence of (experimental) market days.  Each (experimental) market day consists of a 
morning and an evening: in the morning the market is open and you can trade Good X for Good Y; in the 
evening, book-keeping is done and the amount of real money that you have earned for that particular day is 
calculated. Your earnings for any particular day of the experiment depend upon the amounts of the two 
goods with which you end up in that day. Your earnings for the entire experiment consist of the sum of the 
earnings on each and every day.  
 
THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE EXPERIMENT WILL LAST 
  The actual number of market days that the experiment will last will be determined by chance. 
However, there will definitely be at least 18 days in the experiment. After that point, at the end of every day 
that the experiment continues, the computer will generate at random a number which is either zero or one, 
each with probability one-half. If the number is 0 the experiment will stop at that point; if the number is 1 
the experiment will continue for a further day. So the experiment will definitely last at least 18 days, but it 
may last for 19, or 20, or 21, or 22, ... days. The number of days that it will last is thus determined at random 
by the computer. 
 
THE SUBJECTS 
There are two types of subjects in this experiment: Type X subjects who are endowed with 
Good X each day but not with Good Y; Type Y subjects who are endowed with Good Y each day but not with 
Good X. Your daily endowment will be the same on each day that the experiment lasts and you will be told 
your daily endowment before the experiment starts. 
 
THE MARKET 
 In the morning the market is open. In this market, Type X subjects (those who are endowed with 
Good X) are potential sellers of Good X and potential buyers of Good Y, while Type Y subjects (those who 
are endowed with Good Y) are potential buyers of Good X and potential sellers of Good Y.  
 
YOUR PAYMENT 
 Your payment for each day of the experiment is determined by the amounts of the two goods with 
which you end up at the end of that day.  More precisely, if you end up with a quantity x of Good X and a 
quantity y of Good Y you will be paid 10я ?ǆǇ ?pence. (The symbol яindicates the square root.) For example, 
if you end up with 10 of Good X and 10 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я100 pence = 100 pence =  ?1. 00. If 
you end up with 8 of Good X and 18 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я144 pence = 120 pence =  ?1.20. Note 
that if you end up with zero of either good you will be paid nothing. As noted already, your payment for the 
experiment as a whole is the sum of the payments for each of the days that the experiment has lasted.  
  
  
  
 Please note that you cannot carry stocks of the goods over from one day to the next. 
 
               THE TRADING MECHANISM
The trading mechanism used in this experiment is what is called the double auction mechanism. Do 
not worry if you have not encountered this before  W it is easy to understand.  It is a continuous process, 
with trading taking place continuously throughout the trading period. At any time during the trading period 
Type X subjects (those endowed with Good X) can make a bid consisting of a quantity of Good X and a 
quantity of Good Y  W (qX,qY), while Type Y subjects (those endowed with Good Y) can similarly make a bid 
consisting of a quantity of Good X and a quantity of Good Y  W (qX,qY). While these look the same, the 
interpretation is different. For a Type X subject a bid (qX,qY) means that that subject  is willing to offer up to 
qX units of Good X in exchange for at least qY units of Good Y.  For a Type Y subject a bid (qX,qY) means that 
that subject  is willing to offer up to qY units of Good Y in exchange for at least qX units of Good X. We note 
that only integer values are allowed for the quantities in the bids. Obviously sellers must hold the number 
of units that they wish to sell. Any such bids will be posted on all screens for all subjects to see. At any time, 
subjects can accept all or part of any posted bid. Partial acceptance by a Type Y subject of a bid (qX,qY) 
posted by a Type X subject means that the Type Y subject is willing to supply up to qY units of Good Y 
accepting in exchange units of Good X at the rate qX/qY.  Similarly, partial acceptance by a Type X subject of 
a bid (qX,qY) posted by a Type Y subject means that the Type X subject is willing to supply up to qX units of 
Good X accepting in exchange units of Good Y at the rate qY/qX. After acceptance or partial acceptance, the 
good is traded and accounts adjusted by the computer. This bidding, asking and acceptance process 
continues throughout the trading period, which lasts for 4 minutes each day. 
 
 ACCOUNTING 
 As we have already noted: each subject will be told how many units of the two goods that they 
have traded; the computer will carry out the appropriate book-keeping. At the end of each day you will be 
told how many units of the two goods you have ended up with and the earnings implied by these amounts.  
 
PRACTICE SESSIONS 
 In order that you fully understand the experiment, you will be allowed two practice days before the 
experiment proper starts. The earnings you get in these practice days will not count towards your earnings.  
 
 TIMEKEEPING 
Each market session will last four minutes. A clock on all subjects' screens in the top right hand 
corner of the screen will display the time left (in minutes and seconds) to the end of that particular session. 
You will always know how much time is left at any point.  
 
  OTHER 
If you are unsure about any aspect of this experiment please ask one of the experimenters. We hope 
you find it fruitful. 
 
 
  
 
  
Appendix: not to be published: Instructions for the non-monetised trading clearing house  
CESARE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Centro di Economia Sperimentale a Roma Est 
 
 
 Welcome to this experiment on the economics of market decision making.  The Italian Ministry of 
Education, MIUR, has provided the funds for the experiment.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid 
to you in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you can trade two goods  W Good X and 
Good Y  W in a sequence of (experimental) market days.  Each (experimental) market day consists of a 
morning and an evening: in the morning the market is open and you can trade Good X for Good Y; in the 
afternoon, book-keeping is done and the amount of real money that you have earned for that particular day 
is calculated. Your earnings for any particular day of the experiment depend upon the amounts of the two 
goods with which you end up in that day. Your earnings for the entire experiment consist of the sum of the 
earnings on each and every day.  
 
THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE EXPERIMENT WILL LAST 
  The actual number of market days that the experiment will last will be determined by chance. 
However, there will definitely be at least 18 days in the experiment. After that point, at the end of every day 
that the experiment continues, the computer will generate at random a number which is either zero or one, 
each with probability one-half. If the number is 0 the experiment will stop at that point; if the number is 1 
the experiment will continue for a further day. So the experiment will definitely last at least 18 days, but it 
may last for 19, or 20, or 21, or 22, ... days. The number of days that it will last is thus determined at random 
by the computer. 
 
THE SUBJECTS 
There are two types of subjects in this experiment: Type X subjects who are endowed with 
Good X each day but not with Good Y; Type Y subjects who are endowed with Good Y each day but not with 
Good X. Your daily endowment will be the same on each day that the experiment lasts. You will be told 
your Type and your daily endowment before the experiment starts.  
 
THE MARKET 
 In the morning the market is open. In this morning market, Type X subjects (those who are endowed 
with Good X) are potential sellers of Good X and potential buyers of Good Y, while Type Y subjects (those 
who are endowed with Good Y) are potential buyers of Good X and potential sellers of Good Y.  
 
YOUR PAYMENT 
 Your payment for each day of the experiment is determined by the amounts of the two goods with 
which you end up at the end of that day.  More precisely, if you end up with a quantity x of Good X and a 
quantity y of Good Y you will be paid 10яǆǇpence. (The symbol яindicates the square root.)  For example, 
if you end up with 10 of Good X and 10 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я100 pence = 100 pence =  ?1. 00. If 
you end up with 8 of Good X and 18 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я144 pence = 120 pence =  ?1.20. Note 
that if you end up with zero of either good you will be paid nothing. As noted already, your payment for the 
experiment as a whole is the sum of the payments for each of the days that the experiment has lasted.  
 
  
 
  
Please note that you cannot carry stocks of the goods over from one day to the next.  
 
               THE TRADING MECHANISM
The trading mechanism used in this experiment is what is called the clearing house mechanism. Do not 
worry if you have not encountered this before  W it is easy to understand. Type X subjects  W those who are 
endowed with Good X  W are asked to make a bid consisting of a quantity of Good X and a quantity of Good Y 
 W (qX ,qY). Similarly Type Y subjects  W those who are endowed with Good Y  W are asked to make a bid 
consisting of a quantity of Good X and a quantity of Good Y  W (qX ,qY) ?dŚĞdǇƉĞy ?ƐďŝĚǁŝůůďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚƚŽ
mean that this subject is willing to trade at most qX  units of Good X in exchange for at least qY  units of Good 
z ? ŝĨ Ă dǇƉĞ y ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ƚŚĞŶ ŶŽ ďŝĚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ ? dŚĞ dǇƉĞ z ?Ɛ ďŝĚ ǁŝůů ďĞ
interpreted to mean that this subject is willing to trade at most qY units of Good Y in exchange for at least qX  
units of Good X; if a Type Y subject does not want to trade, then no bid should be entered. We note that only 
integer values are allowed for the quantities in the bids. Of course, sellers must actually have the units of the 
good they are intending to sell. There is a pre-determined time for entering bids and asks, and the computer 
will display the remaining time. If a subject does not enter a bid, the computer will interpret this as the 
subject not wanting to trade. When the time has elapsed, the computer will calculate the equilibrium 
exchange rate between the two goods and the traded quantities in the market. The equilibrium exchange 
rate will be determined as the exchange rate at which the quantities offered for sale are equal to the 
quantities demanded for purchase, for both goods. The computer will then inform each subject of the 
amounts they have bought and the amounts of the other good that they have sold. It is important to note: 
(1) that a buyer may not be able to buy all the quantity he or she bid for if the implicit exchange rate in the 
bid is lower than the equilibrium exchange rate or the quantity offered by the sellers is not sufficiently high; 
(2) that a buyer may pay less than the number of units offered if the equilibrium exchange rate is lower than 
the exchange rate in the bid; (3) that a seller may not be able to sell all the quantity he or she offered if the 
exchange rate implicit in the bid is higher than the equilibrium exchange rate or if the quantity demanded by 
the buyers is not sufficiently high; (4) that a seller may get more than the number of units asked for if the 
equilibrium exchange rate is higher than the exchange rate implicit in the bid. We note that the equilibrium 
prices and quantities will be integers.  
 
ACCOUNTING 
 As we have already noted: each subject will be told how many units of the two goods that they have 
traded. The computer will carry out the appropriate book-keeping. At the end of each day you will be told 
how many units of the two goods you have ended up with and the earnings implied by these amounts.  
 
PRACTICE SESSIONS 
 In order that you fully understand the experiment, you will be allowed two practice days before the 
experiment proper starts. The earnings you get in these practice days will not count towards your earnings.  
 
 TIMEKEEPING 
Each market session will last four minutes. A clock on all subjects' screens in the top right hand corner 
of the screen will display the time left (in minutes and seconds) to the end of that particular session. You will 
always know how much time is left at any point. If you do not enter a bid during the time allowed, your bid 
will be taken to be zero. 
 
  OTHER 
If you are unsure about any aspect of this experiment please ask one of the experimenters. We hope 
you find it fruitful. 
  
  
  
 
  
Appendix: not to be published: Instructions for the monetised trading double auction 
CESARE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Centro di Economia Sperimentale a Roma Est 
 
 
 Welcome to this experiment on the economics of market decision making.  The Italian Ministry of 
Education, MIUR, has provided the funds for the experiment.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid 
to you in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   In this experiment we are going to simulate two markets in which you can buy or sell two goods  W 
Good X and Good Y  W in a sequence of (experimental) market days.  Each (experimental) market day consists 
of a morning, an afternoon and an evening: in the morning the market for Good X is open and you can buy or 
sell Good X using (experimental) money; in the afternoon the market for Good Y is open and you may buy or 
sell Good Y using (experimental) money; in the evening, book-keeping is done and the amount of real money 
that you have earned for that particular day is calculated. Your earnings for any particular (experimental) day 
of the experiment depend upon the amounts of the two goods with which you end up in that day. Your 
earnings for the entire experiment consist of the sum of the earnings on each and every day.  The actual 
experimental money used to facilitate trade during the experiment becomes worthless at the end of it. 
 
THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE EXPERIMENT WILL LAST 
  The actual number of market days that the experiment will last will be determined by chance. 
However, there will definitely be at least 18 days in the experiment. After that point, at the end of every day 
that the experiment continues, the computer will generate at random a number which is either zero or one, 
each with probability one-half. If the number is 0 the experiment will stop at that point; if the number is 1 
the experiment will continue for a further day. So the experiment will definitely last at least 18 days, but it 
may last for 19, or 20, or 21, or 22, ... days. The number of days that it will last is thus determined at random 
by the computer. 
 
THE SUBJECTS 
There are two types of subjects in this experiment: Type X subjects who are endowed with 
Good X each day but not with Good Y; Type Y subjects who are endowed with Good Y each day but not with 
Good X. Your daily endowment will be the same on each day that the experiment lasts and you will be told 
your daily endowment before the experiment starts. In addition all subjects are endowed at the beginning 
of the experiment with some experimental money: this is to facilitate trade only and becomes worthless at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
THE MARKETS 
 In the morning the market for Good X is open. In this morning market, Type X subjects (those who 
are endowed with Good X) are potential sellers of the good while Type Y subjects (those who are endowed 
with Good Y) are potential buyers of the good. In the afternoon the market for Good Y is open.  In this 
afternoon market, Type X subjects (those who are endowed with Good X) are potential buyers of the good 
while Type Y subjects (those who are endowed with Good Y) are potential sellers of the good.  The trading 
rules are described below.  
 
YOUR PAYMENT 
  
 
  
 Your payment for each day of the experiment is determined by the amounts of the two goods with 
which you end up at the end of that day.  More precisely, if you end up with a quantity x of Good X and a 
quantity y of Good Y you will be paid 10я ?ǆǇ ?pence. (The symbol яindicates the square root.) For example, 
if you end up with 10 of Good X and 10 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я100 pence = 100 pence =  ?1. 00. If 
you end up with 8 of Good X and 18 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я144 pence = 120 pence =  ?1.20. Note 
that if you end up with zero of either good you will be paid nothing. As noted already, your payment for the 
experiment as a whole is the sum of the payments for each of the days that the experiment has lasted.  
  
 Please note that you cannot carry stocks of the goods over from one day to the next - experimental 
money alone can be held from one day to the next.  
 
               THE TRADING MECHANISM
The trading mechanism used in this experiment is what is called the double auction mechanism. Do 
not worry if you have not encountered this before  W it is easy to understand.  It is a continuous process, 
with trading taking place continuously throughout the trading period. At any time during the trading period 
potential buyers can make a bid consisting of a price and a quantity  W (p,q)   W and potential sellers can make 
an ask consisting also of a price and a quantity  W (p,q). A bid (p,q) means that that buyer is willing to pay up 
to a price p for up to q units of the good. Likewise, an ask (p,q) means that the seller is willing to accept any 
price down to p for up to q units of the good. We note that only integer values are allowed for the prices 
and quantities in the bids and asks. Obviously sellers must hold the number of units that they wish to sell 
and buyers must have the experimental money necessary to pay for the bid (namely pq). Any such bids and 
asks will be posted on all screens for all traders to see. At any time, buyers can accept all or part of any 
posted ask and sellers can accept all or part of any posted bid. Partial acceptance of a bid (p,q) by some 
seller means that the seller will sell up to q units of the good at the price p.  Similarly partial acceptance of 
an ask (p,q) by some buyer means that the buyer will buy up to q units of the good at the price p.  After 
acceptance or partial acceptance, the good is traded and accounts adjusted by the computer. This bidding, 
asking and acceptance process continues throughout the trading period. 
 
 ACCOUNTING 
 As we have already noted: each buyer will be told how many units they have bought and the prices 
that they paid at the end of each market; each seller will be told how many units they have sold and the 
prices that they received at the end of each market; The computer will carry out the appropriate 
book-keeping. At the end of each day you will be told how many units of the two goods you have ended up 
with and the earnings implied by these amounts, and the amount of experimental money with which you 
end up the day.  
 
PRACTICE SESSIONS 
 In order that you fully understand the experiment, you will be allowed two practice days before the 
experiment proper starts. The earnings you get in these practice days will not count towards your earnings. 
Your endowment of experimental money will be put back to its original amount at the end of the practice 
days and before the experiment proper starts. 
 
 TIMEKEEPING 
Each market session (morning and afternoon) will last four minutes. A clock on all subjects' screens in 
the top right hand corner of the screen will display the time left (in minutes and seconds) to the end of that 
particular session. You will always know how much time is left at any point.  
 
  OTHER 
If you are unsure about any aspect of this experiment please ask one of the experimenters. We hope 
you find it fruitful.  
  
 
  
Appendix: not to be published: Instructions for the monetised trading clearing house 
CESARE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Centro di Economia Sperimentale a Roma Est 
 
 
 Welcome to this experiment on the economics of market decision making.  The Italian Ministry of 
Education, MIUR, has provided the funds for the experiment.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid 
to you in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   In this experiment we are going to simulate two markets in which you can buy or sell two goods  W 
Good X and Good Y  W in a sequence of market days.  Each market day consists of a morning, an afternoon 
and an evening: in the morning the market for Good X is open and you can buy or sell Good X using 
(experimental) money; in the afternoon the market for Good Y is open and you may buy or sell Good Y using 
(experimental) money; in the evening, book-keeping is done and the amount of real money that you have 
earned for that particular day is calculated. Your earnings for any particular day of the experiment depend 
upon the amounts of the two goods with which you end up in that day. Your earnings for the entire 
experiment consist of the sum of the earnings on each and every day. The actual experimental money used 
to facilitate trade during the experiment becomes worthless at the end of it. 
 
THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE EXPERIMENT WILL LAST 
  The actual number of market days that the experiment will last will be determined by chance. 
However, there will definitely be at least 18 days in the experiment. After that point, at the end of every day 
that the experiment continues, the computer will generate at random a number which is either zero or one, 
each with probability one-half. If the number is 0 the experiment will stop at that point; if the number is 1 
the experiment will continue for a further day. So the experiment will definitely last at least 18 days, but it 
may last for 19, or 20, or 21, or 22, ... days. The number of days that it will last is thus determined at random 
by the computer. 
 
THE SUBJECTS 
There are two types of subjects in this experiment: Type X subjects who are endowed with 
Good X each day but not with Good Y; Type Y subjects who are endowed with Good Y each day but not with 
Good X. Your daily endowment will be the same on each day that the experiment lasts. You will be told 
your Type and your daily endowment before the experiment starts. In addition all subjects are endowed at 
the beginning of the experiment with some experimental money: this is to facilitate trade only and 
becomes worthless at the end of the experiment. 
 
THE MARKETS 
 In the morning the market for Good X is open. In this morning market, Type X subjects (those who 
are endowed with Good X) are potential sellers of the good while Type Y subjects (those who are endowed 
with Good Y) are potential buyers of the good. In the afternoon the market for Good Y is open.  In this 
afternoon market, Type X subjects (those who are endowed with Good X) are potential buyers of the good 
while Type Y subjects (those who are endowed with Good Y) are potential sellers of the good.  The trading 
rules are described below.  
 
YOUR PAYMENT 
  
 
  
 Your payment for each day of the experiment is determined by the amounts of the two goods with 
which you end up at the end of that day.  More precisely, if you end up with a quantity x of Good X and a 
quantity y of Good Y you will be paid 10я ?ǆǇ ?pence. (The symbol яindicates the square root.)  For example, 
if you end up with 10 of Good X and 10 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я100 pence = 100 pence =  ?1.00. If you 
end up with 8 of Good X and 18 of Good Y you will be paid  ? ?я144 pence = 120 pence =  ?1.20. Note that if 
you end up with zero of either good you will be paid nothing. As noted already, your payment for the 
experiment as a whole is the sum of the payments for each of the days that the experiment has lasted.  
 
Please note that you cannot carry stocks of the goods over from one day to the next - experimental 
money alone can be held from one day to the next.  
 
               THE TRADING MECHANISM
The trading mechanism used in this experiment is what is called the clearing house mechanism. Do 
not worry if you have not encountered this before  W it is easy to understand. Buyers are asked to make a 
bid consisting of a price and a quantity  W (p,q). Sellers are asked to make an ask consisting also of a price 
and a quantity  W (p,q) ?dŚĞďƵǇĞƌ ?ƐďŝĚǁŝůůďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚƚŽŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ the buyer is willing to buy up to the 
stated quantity at no more than the stated price; if a buyer does not want to buy at any price, then no bid 
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ ? dŚĞƐĞůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƐŬǁŝůůďĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĚƚŽŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞůůĞƌ ŝƐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƐĞůůƵƉƚŽƚŚĞ 
stated quantity at no less than the stated price; if a seller does not want to sell at any price, no ask should 
be entered. We note that only integer values are allowed for the prices and quantities in the bids and asks. 
Of course, buyers must have the (experimental) money with which to finance the purchase; likewise sellers 
must actually have the units of the good they are intending to sell.  There is a pre-determined time for 
entering bids and asks, and the computer will display the remaining time. If a buyer does not enter a bid, 
the computer will interpret this as the buyer being unwilling to buy at any price. If a seller does not enter an 
ask, the computer will interpret this as the seller being unwilling to sell at any price. When the time has 
elapsed, the computer will calculate the equilibrium price and the traded quantity in the market. The 
equilibrium price will be determined as the price at which the quantities offered for sale are equal to the 
quantities demanded for purchase. The computer will then inform each buyer of the amounts they have 
bought and the price which they paid and will inform each seller of the amounts they have sold and the 
price which they received. It is important to note: (1) that a buyer may not be able to buy all the quantity 
he or she bid for if the price in the bid is lower than the equilibrium price or the quantity offered by the 
sellers is not sufficient; (2) that a buyer may pay less than the price in the bid if the equilibrium price is 
lower than the price in the bid; (3) that a seller may not be able to sell all the quantity he or she asked for if 
the price in the ask is higher than the equilibrium price or the quantity demanded by the buyers is not 
sufficient; (4) that a seller may get more than the price in the ask if the equilibrium price is higher than the 
price in the ask.  We note that the equilibrium prices and quantities will be integers. Occasionally there will 
be more than one equilibrium price; in such cases the computer will chose one of these at random. 
 
 ACCOUNTING 
 As we have already noted: each buyer will be told how many units they have bought and the price 
that they paid at the end of each market; each seller will be told how many units they have sold and the 
price that they received at the end of each market. The computer will carry out the appropriate 
book-keeping. At the end of each day you will be told how many units of the two goods you have ended up 
with and the earnings implied by these amounts, and the amount of experimental money with which you 
end up the day.  
 
PRACTICE SESSIONS 
 In order that you fully understand the experiment, you will be allowed two practice days before the 
experiment proper starts. The earnings you get in these practice days will not count towards your earnings. 
  
 
  
Your endowment of experimental money will be put back to its original amount at the end of the practice 
days. 
 
 TIMEKEEPING 
Each market session (morning and afternoon) will last four minutes. A clock on all subjects' screens in 
the top right hand corner of the screen will display the time left (in minutes and seconds) to the end of that 
particular session. You will always know how much time is left at any point. If you do not enter a bid or ask 
during the time allowed, your bid or ask will be taken to be zero 
 
  OTHER 
If you are unsure about any aspect of this experiment please ask one of the experimenters. We hope 
you find it fruitful. 
  
   
